Расследование завершено Катастрофа самолета Boeing 737-8KN А6-FDN в Ростовской области 19.03.2016 - обсуждение
Denis Rook
Старожил
Страница 176 Отчета. неточность перевода в расшифровке - "Sound effect of rising or falling items sound in flight deck." -
"Звук падающих предметов в кабине."
Однако в английском тексте речь идет о "взлетающих или падающих" - то есть падающих на потолок или на пол, не настаивая на том, что именно в этот момент перегрузка изменилась от отрицательной на положительную.
"Звук падающих предметов в кабине."
Однако в английском тексте речь идет о "взлетающих или падающих" - то есть падающих на потолок или на пол, не настаивая на том, что именно в этот момент перегрузка изменилась от отрицательной на положительную.
TG
вернувшийся
В случае Эмбраера этот "кружечек" и является Flight Director И других там нет.Я же говорю, что применена другая логика управления.
Тебе показываются не первичные параметры : создай такой то тангаж и крен и мы полетим в нужное место.
Здесь тебе показывается уже более высокий уровень - рассчитанные результаты твоих первичных воздействий. Ты задрал самолёт вверх с тангажем +10 и правым креном 5 например, а птичка вектора показывает тебе что на самом деле мы снижаемся с углом -3 и все ещё разворачиваемся влево.
На самолёте где это единственный и основной тип индикации к этому быстро привыкаешь и в мозгах перещелкивается принцип и понимание.
Но вот в случае когда есть HUD и PFD и они используют разные принципы директорного управления, это уже не так просто.
Видимо отсюда растут уши требований FlyDubay постоянного использования HUD.
Последнее редактирование:
Pokemon
Captain Pikachu
Любая директорная система является функцией отклонения, то есть математической производной какой-либо величины. Летая по «директорам» пилоты постепенно перестают видеть первопричины отклонений и теряют навыки управления ВС, Boeing то или Airbus. Причём, не важно как реализовано директорное управление, оно само по себе - скрытое зло.
ubadger
Местный
Любая механизация/автоматизация - это зло, так как ведёт к потере каких-то навыков человеком. Научившись ездить на лошади, люди разучились ходить пешком на длинные дистанции, а с изобретением автомобиля всё стало ещё хуже.
На картинке - реконструкции HUD, страницы 174 и 187 отчета, явно видно, что HUD ему достаточно доходчиво объяснял, что самолёт находится в сложном пространственном положении, он не просто знак "минус" у углов тангажа на "лесенке" не видел, при угле тангажа на пикирование более 10 градусов HUD выводил ему "шеврон", показывающий "вверх" (2-я картинка), а при угле тангажа на пикирование более 20 градусов картинка меняется полностью (3-я картинка).
В отчете, на странице 189, есть оговорка, что:
В ходе работы комиссии некоторые пилоты отмечали, что в стрессовой ситуации примененная индикация (две не параллельные линии) может быть неправильно интерпретирована пилотом, так как схожая по внешнему виду индикация используется для отображения ВПП при работе HUDв режиме AIII
но, скорее, как и в Казани, сыграло роль то, что они влетели в низкую облачность, которую КВС, "по ощущениям" с прошлого ухода на второй круг, который был намного более пологим, не ожидал так быстро, и потерю огней аэродрома в облачности он воспринял как резкое увеличение тангажа на кабрирование, поэтому и жал с таким остервенением от себя, игнорируя даже вмешательство второго пилота - он был абсолютно уверен, что воспринимает ситуацию правильно, надо просто опустить нос и снова увидеть огни аэродрома, меняющуюся же индикацию HUD он воспринимал как подтверждение того, что самолёт всё сильнее кабрирует, считывая её "от обратного", что стрелки вверх на HUD - значит нос сейчас вверх.
Ну, а то, что он, после того как увидел аэродром визуально при заходе, "переключился" в визуальный режим и не смог вернутся в инструментальный при начале ухода на второй круг - это, уже, психика. Похоже, КВС был перфекционистом, судя по тому, как он обсуждал детали первого ухода на второй круг (страницы 135-137 отчета) с ВП, и ещё одна неудачная попытка его, видимо, "вырубила" психологически, после двухчасового "висения".
Настолько полно игнорировать показания и приборов и HUD, и ещё и на противодействие второго пилота не обращать внимания, в инструментальном режиме, мне кажется, всё же невозможно.
TG
вернувшийся
У Эмбраера допустимое время нажатия 3сек затем блокировка,
у Бомбардье через 3сек блокировки нет, но включается неприятный звуковой сигнал.
У басика так просто вообще нет кнопки перекладки стаба. ))
И только у Боинга нет ни ограничения , ни сигнализации только привычный фоновый треск вращающегося колеса.
у Бомбардье через 3сек блокировки нет, но включается неприятный звуковой сигнал.
У басика так просто вообще нет кнопки перекладки стаба. ))
И только у Боинга нет ни ограничения , ни сигнализации только привычный фоновый треск вращающегося колеса.
Mihail_h
Местный
Интересный коммент с pprune
Fox_one perfectly highlights the problem with flydubai's fatigue reporting system. If you reported fatigued you would be taken off flying whilst the company decided, in consultation with an AME, if fatigue was an issue. This could take a considerable time, and if they decided that it was not then the time you spent not flying was recorded as sick leave. Bearing in mind that you were only allowed paid sick leave for fifteen days per year, if they decided that there was nothing wrong with your roster and you were therefore not fatigued you could potentially spend a long period not being paid until you returned to flying, and living in Dubai is expensive, especially if you have a family. To be fair to the company they did go through the motions of improving things, but even two years after the accident one of the second officers was called into a meeting with the chief pilot after he had not felt fit to fly due to lack of sleep having been kept awake by his newly born baby, to be told by the chief pilot that in his (the chief pilot's) opinion, if he could not manage his sleep with a new baby in the house he was not only unfit to be a professional pilot, but unfit to be a parent. That, by the way, was the new chief pilot who was put in place when the previous one was promoted out of the way following the accident. With that sort of thing to contend with it is hardly surprising that people didn't report fatigued, instead it was not uncommon for occupants of both seats to be taking controlled rest of one or two hours on long night flights.
There were also issues with training. I joined the company as a type rated DEC two years before the accident happened and left two years afterwards. For my OCC I was paired up with a type rated F/O, and despite what was quoted in the report regarding the training to use the HUD we never swapped seats, so that was at least one F/O who didn't get to use the HUD during his training. Also, despite the syllabus quoted in the report, shortly after the accident I asked an F/O who I knew had joined non type rated how many standard two engine go-arounds he had done in training and the answer was one, flown by the captain during LVO training. He had done a couple of others due to systems failures, also in the LVO training, but had never done one himself. He had also never flown using the HUD as his training had been done with two F/Os and a stand in captain, so also no seat swapping, although he had seen the hud repeater image in the back of the sim whilst observing. Also, up until the accident there was no SOP to brief how a go around was to be flown, indeed when I did this on my first day of line training I was told by the LTC not to do so, as it wasn't SOP and might confuse F/Os who did not have English as their first language.
On the subject of the HUD, I can't help thinking that flydubai did the accident crew, and indeed all the crew members who went through the type rating training with them, a great miss service. The SOP, as high lighted in the accident report, was for the HUD to be used for all stages of flight, and as mentioned in the report their are many stages of flight where this is not an advantage. Flying the HUD, for those who haven't done it, is just like being in a giant computer game, and takes away a lot of situational awareness, as you don't have the map display to look at. Also, flydubai got everyone into a mind set of flying all approaches manually from 1000ft, as that was what was required for a cat3a approach. With the weather conditions these pilots experienced at Rostov I9and this is just personal) would have left the automatics engaged for as long as possible, right down to cat1 minimas if I felt it neccessary. There was no reason for the captain to disengage the autopilot and auto-throttle except that it was what he was used to doing. Many of the captains who joined the company from other airlines would ignore the SOP and only use the HUD for cat2 or 3 approaches. Unfortunately flydubais training in bad weather ops was limited, as most line training flights were done on short sectors around the Gulf to make it easier for the line trainers.
As a caveat to all this, I left two years ago. Maybe things have changed, but I'm surprised that this isn't being discussed on the ME forum or that there don't seem to be more posts from flydubai pilots. Having said that I am lucky not to have to access PPRuNe through a VPN anymore, and wonder if it is still blocked in the UAE?
Fox_one perfectly highlights the problem with flydubai's fatigue reporting system. If you reported fatigued you would be taken off flying whilst the company decided, in consultation with an AME, if fatigue was an issue. This could take a considerable time, and if they decided that it was not then the time you spent not flying was recorded as sick leave. Bearing in mind that you were only allowed paid sick leave for fifteen days per year, if they decided that there was nothing wrong with your roster and you were therefore not fatigued you could potentially spend a long period not being paid until you returned to flying, and living in Dubai is expensive, especially if you have a family. To be fair to the company they did go through the motions of improving things, but even two years after the accident one of the second officers was called into a meeting with the chief pilot after he had not felt fit to fly due to lack of sleep having been kept awake by his newly born baby, to be told by the chief pilot that in his (the chief pilot's) opinion, if he could not manage his sleep with a new baby in the house he was not only unfit to be a professional pilot, but unfit to be a parent. That, by the way, was the new chief pilot who was put in place when the previous one was promoted out of the way following the accident. With that sort of thing to contend with it is hardly surprising that people didn't report fatigued, instead it was not uncommon for occupants of both seats to be taking controlled rest of one or two hours on long night flights.
There were also issues with training. I joined the company as a type rated DEC two years before the accident happened and left two years afterwards. For my OCC I was paired up with a type rated F/O, and despite what was quoted in the report regarding the training to use the HUD we never swapped seats, so that was at least one F/O who didn't get to use the HUD during his training. Also, despite the syllabus quoted in the report, shortly after the accident I asked an F/O who I knew had joined non type rated how many standard two engine go-arounds he had done in training and the answer was one, flown by the captain during LVO training. He had done a couple of others due to systems failures, also in the LVO training, but had never done one himself. He had also never flown using the HUD as his training had been done with two F/Os and a stand in captain, so also no seat swapping, although he had seen the hud repeater image in the back of the sim whilst observing. Also, up until the accident there was no SOP to brief how a go around was to be flown, indeed when I did this on my first day of line training I was told by the LTC not to do so, as it wasn't SOP and might confuse F/Os who did not have English as their first language.
On the subject of the HUD, I can't help thinking that flydubai did the accident crew, and indeed all the crew members who went through the type rating training with them, a great miss service. The SOP, as high lighted in the accident report, was for the HUD to be used for all stages of flight, and as mentioned in the report their are many stages of flight where this is not an advantage. Flying the HUD, for those who haven't done it, is just like being in a giant computer game, and takes away a lot of situational awareness, as you don't have the map display to look at. Also, flydubai got everyone into a mind set of flying all approaches manually from 1000ft, as that was what was required for a cat3a approach. With the weather conditions these pilots experienced at Rostov I9and this is just personal) would have left the automatics engaged for as long as possible, right down to cat1 minimas if I felt it neccessary. There was no reason for the captain to disengage the autopilot and auto-throttle except that it was what he was used to doing. Many of the captains who joined the company from other airlines would ignore the SOP and only use the HUD for cat2 or 3 approaches. Unfortunately flydubais training in bad weather ops was limited, as most line training flights were done on short sectors around the Gulf to make it easier for the line trainers.
As a caveat to all this, I left two years ago. Maybe things have changed, but I'm surprised that this isn't being discussed on the ME forum or that there don't seem to be more posts from flydubai pilots. Having said that I am lucky not to have to access PPRuNe through a VPN anymore, and wonder if it is still blocked in the UAE?
DAR
Старожил
Ролик от Игоря Зырянова
xdrew
Новичок
Сорри если повторю что уже обсуждалось - но почему при уходе на второй, не использовался АП? На заходе отключили (тоже непонятно, для тренировки навыков?), но дальше можно бы и включить, чтобы не бороться на фоне усталости?
OlegM
Ангел Божий
В 1-й серии 22-го сезона "Расследований авиакатастроф" рассматривается эта катастрофа. Можно увидеть воочию, что показывали приборы и что было видно в окно...