Sergey1993
Новичок
правильно, не хватило умения летать на руках.
Да, это другая катастрофа, но поскольку они несколько похожи, а у нас пока нет более подробной информации МАК, может попробуем рассмотреть, как кто понимает вопросы в отчёте катастрофы Бейрут
This raises a series of questions:
- Why didn‟t the PF trim that aircraft properly?
- Why, out of 4‟ 17” of flight, that aircraft was in trim for less than 40”?
- Why was the PF using the elevator in a manner inconsistent with the FD command and sometimes giving opposite inputs between the elevator and the electrical trim; trimming up while pushing down (31)?
- Why was the PF using the rudder and ailerons in a manner inducing “cross control” situations and inconsistent with the FD demands and the recovery procedures he had practiced during training?
- What had happened to the pilot‟s basic flying skills and what was the reason for such degraded performance?
__________________
(31)
In fact, the B737 type aircraft is equipped with a cutout function which will stop the electric trim if the column moves in the opposite direction, beyond the neutral range. This neutral range is defined such as the electric trim in the opposite direction (nose up in this case) will cutout when the control column is deflected in a nose down direction of between 2.5 to 3.9 degrees. A review of the DFDR data shows a control column deflection of 2.0 degrees in the nose down direction during the stabilizer nose up command electric command.
As such, consistent with its design, the column deflection on the accident flight did not activate the stabilizer trim cutout switch at that time.
Да, это другая катастрофа, но поскольку они несколько похожи, а у нас пока нет более подробной информации МАК, может попробуем рассмотреть, как кто понимает вопросы в отчёте катастрофы Бейрут
This raises a series of questions:
- Why didn‟t the PF trim that aircraft properly?
- Why, out of 4‟ 17” of flight, that aircraft was in trim for less than 40”?
- Why was the PF using the elevator in a manner inconsistent with the FD command and sometimes giving opposite inputs between the elevator and the electrical trim; trimming up while pushing down (31)?
- Why was the PF using the rudder and ailerons in a manner inducing “cross control” situations and inconsistent with the FD demands and the recovery procedures he had practiced during training?
- What had happened to the pilot‟s basic flying skills and what was the reason for such degraded performance?
__________________
(31)
In fact, the B737 type aircraft is equipped with a cutout function which will stop the electric trim if the column moves in the opposite direction, beyond the neutral range. This neutral range is defined such as the electric trim in the opposite direction (nose up in this case) will cutout when the control column is deflected in a nose down direction of between 2.5 to 3.9 degrees. A review of the DFDR data shows a control column deflection of 2.0 degrees in the nose down direction during the stabilizer nose up command electric command.
As such, consistent with its design, the column deflection on the accident flight did not activate the stabilizer trim cutout switch at that time.
